OpenClaw Credential Protection: Secure API Keys

Updated: 8 min read

Credential vault protected from malicious skills, network exfiltration, and prompt injection attacks

Malicious skills target credentials first. API keys, cloud tokens, SSH keys, and database passwords are the highest-value targets for attackers. This guide shows you how to keep them safe.

How OpenClaw Skills Steal Credentials

OpenClaw skills can access credentials through several vectors:

  1. Environment variables: Skills can read process.env to access any loaded env vars
  2. File system access: Skills can read .env, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/, etc.
  3. Shell history: Commands containing tokens get logged to ~/.bash_history
  4. Git history: Accidentally committed secrets remain in git history
  5. Prompt context: Credentials pasted into prompts become part of the AI context

Rule 1: Keep API Keys Out of OpenClaw’s Reach

Exclude Files from OpenClaw

Configure OpenClaw to ignore sensitive files:

{
  "exclude": [
    ".env",
    ".env.*",
    "*.pem",
    "*.key",
    "credentials.json",
    "service-account.json",
    ".aws/**",
    ".ssh/**",
    ".netrc"
  ]
}

Use Environment Variable Managers

Instead of .env files, use dedicated secret managers:

1Password CLI:

# Load secrets at runtime, not stored on disk
eval $(op signin)
export API_KEY=$(op read "op://Development/MyAPI/credential")

direnv with encrypted files:

# .envrc (tracked in git — contains no secrets)
export API_KEY=$(sops -d secrets.enc.yaml | yq '.api_key')

AWS Secrets Manager:

export DB_PASSWORD=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value \
  --secret-id myapp/db-password \
  --query SecretString --output text)

Rule 2: Isolate OpenClaw Credential Access

Separate Credential Scopes

Create different credential profiles for different contexts:

# Development profile — limited access
export AWS_PROFILE=dev-readonly

# Never use production credentials locally
# Production credentials should only exist in CI/CD

Use Short-Lived Tokens

Prefer short-lived tokens over long-lived API keys:

# AWS: Use STS temporary credentials
aws sts get-session-token --duration-seconds 3600

# GitHub: Use fine-grained personal access tokens
# Set expiration to 7 days, minimal permissions

Rule 3: Detect OpenClaw Credential Leaks

Git Pre-Commit Hooks

Prevent secrets from being committed:

# Install gitleaks
brew install gitleaks

# Add pre-commit hook
cat > .git/hooks/pre-commit << 'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
gitleaks protect --staged --verbose
EOF
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit

Monitor for Leaks

Set up monitoring for credential exposure:

  • Enable GitHub secret scanning on your repositories
  • Use tools like trufflehog for historical scans
  • Set up alerts on your cloud provider for unusual API usage

Rule 4: Rotate Compromised API Keys Immediately

If you suspect any credential exposure:

  1. Immediately rotate the affected credential
  2. Check access logs for unauthorized usage
  3. Review billing for unexpected charges
  4. Update all systems that use the credential

Quick Rotation Checklist

CredentialWhere to Rotate
AWS keysIAM Console → Security Credentials
GitHub tokensSettings → Developer Settings → PATs
OpenAI API keyplatform.openai.com → API Keys
Database passwordDirect DB access or cloud console
SSH keysRemove from ~/.ssh/ + authorized_keys

Rule 5: Sandbox OpenClaw to Block Credential Theft

Even with the measures above, use a sandbox as the last line of defense:

Enable OpenClaw sandboxing so tool execution runs in an isolated container with a separate workspace (see Sandbox Setup). This is the strongest “last line of defense” against accidental credential reads/exfiltration.

This ensures that even if a skill attempts to read credentials, there’s nothing to find.

Emergency Response for Credential Compromise

If credentials have been compromised:

  1. Rotate immediately — don’t wait
  2. Check audit logs for all affected services
  3. Notify your team and security contacts
  4. Document the incident for post-mortem
  5. Report the malicious skill to ClawHub

See our Security Guide for the full incident response procedure.