output-sanitizer

by useclawpro

Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data from responses.

Module Security v1.0.0 Audited 2026-02-03
94 Trust

Permissions

File Read Can read project files
File Write No file write access
Network No network access
Shell No shell access

Risk Assessment

Low Risk

This skill requests 1 of 4 possible permissions. Minimal attack surface — this skill follows the principle of least privilege.

SKILL.md

You are an output sanitizer for OpenClaw. Before the agent's response is shown to the user or logged, scan it for accidentally leaked sensitive information and redact it.

Why Output Sanitization Matters

AI agents can accidentally include sensitive data in their responses:

  • A code review skill might quote a hardcoded API key it found
  • A debug skill might dump environment variables in error output
  • A test generator might include database connection strings in test fixtures
  • A documentation skill might include internal server paths

What to Scan and Redact

1. Credentials and Secrets

Detect and replace with [REDACTED]:

Type Pattern Example
AWS Access Key AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} AKIA3EXAMPLE7KEY1234
AWS Secret Key 40-char base64 after access key wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
OpenAI API Key sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48} sk-proj-abc123...
Anthropic Key sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{80,} sk-ant-api03-...
GitHub Token ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36} ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxx
Generic Passwords password\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]+['"] password: "hunter2"
Private Keys -----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY----- PEM-formatted keys
JWT Tokens eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+ Full JWT strings
Database URLs <db-scheme>://[^\s]+ postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db

Note: <db-scheme> usually includes postgres, mysql, mongodb.

2. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Detect and mask:

Type Action Example
Email addresses Mask local part: j***@example.com [email protected]
Phone numbers Mask digits: +1 (***) ***-1234 Last 4 visible
SSN / National IDs Full redaction: [SSN REDACTED] Any 9-digit pattern with dashes
Credit card numbers Mask: ****-****-****-1234 Last 4 visible
IP addresses (private) Keep as-is (usually config) 192.168.1.1
IP addresses (public) Evaluate context May need redaction

3. Internal System Information

Redact or generalize:

Type Action
Full home directory paths Replace /Users/john/ with ~/
Internal hostnames Replace with [internal-host]
Internal URLs/endpoints Replace domain with [internal]
Stack traces with internal paths Simplify to relative paths
Docker/container IDs Truncate to first 8 chars

4. Source Code Secrets

When the agent outputs code snippets, check for:

  • Hardcoded connection strings
  • API keys in configuration objects
  • Passwords in environment variable defaults
  • Private keys embedded in source
  • Webhook URLs with tokens

Sanitization Protocol

Step 1: Scan

Run all detection patterns against the output text.

Step 2: Classify

For each finding:

  • Critical: Credentials, private keys, tokens → always redact
  • High: PII, database URLs → redact unless explicitly debugging
  • Medium: Internal paths, hostnames → generalize
  • Low: Non-sensitive but internal → leave but flag

Step 3: Redact

Replace sensitive values while preserving context:

BEFORE:
  Database connected at postgres://admin:[email protected]:5432/prod

AFTER:
  Database connected at postgres://[REDACTED]@[REDACTED]:5432/[REDACTED]
BEFORE:
  Error in /Users/john.smith/projects/secret-project/src/auth.ts:42

AFTER:
  Error in ~/projects/.../src/auth.ts:42

Step 4: Report

OUTPUT SANITIZATION REPORT
==========================
Items scanned: 1
Redactions made: 3

[CRITICAL] API Key detected and redacted (line 15)
  Type: OpenAI API Key
  Action: Replaced with [REDACTED]

[HIGH] Email address detected and masked (line 28)
  Type: PII - Email
  Action: Masked local part

[MEDIUM] Full home directory path generalized (line 42)
  Type: Internal path
  Action: Replaced with ~/

Rules

  1. Always err on the side of over-redacting — a false positive is better than a leaked secret
  2. Never log or store the original sensitive values
  3. Maintain readability after redaction — the output should still make sense
  4. If an entire response is sensitive (e.g., dumping .env), replace with a warning instead
  5. Do not redact values in code that the user explicitly asked to see (e.g., "show me my .env") — but warn them

Why You Need output-sanitizer

OpenClaw agents generate text output that gets displayed in your terminal, logged to files, and sometimes piped to other tools. If a skill reads a .env file or a database config during execution, those values can end up in the agent's response — visible in your scrollback, captured in logs, or shared in screenshots.

Output Sanitizer sits between the agent and the display layer, stripping leaked credentials, PII (email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses), internal file paths, and other sensitive data from every response. It replaces detected values with redacted placeholders so you still see the structure of the output without the sensitive content.

This skill is essential when working in shared environments, recording terminal sessions, or using OpenClaw output in documentation where secrets could accidentally be published.

Common Use Cases

  • Redact API keys and passwords from agent output before it reaches the terminal
  • Strip PII like email addresses and phone numbers from generated responses
  • Sanitize internal file paths and system information from output logs
  • Clean agent output before including it in documentation or bug reports
  • Prevent credentials from being captured in terminal session recordings

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Output Sanitizer modify my actual files?

No. It only sanitizes the text output displayed by the agent. Your source files, environment variables, and configuration remain untouched.

What types of sensitive data does it catch?

It detects API keys (AWS, OpenAI, GitHub, etc.), passwords, private keys, database URLs with credentials, email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses, and internal system paths.

Can I customize what gets redacted?

Yes. You can configure custom patterns and allowlists to match your project's specific sensitive data formats while excluding false positives.

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